Abstract: Coastal development has advantages, such as job creation, and drawbacks, such as the loss of environmental amenities, for both residents and non-residents. Local governments may prioritize their constituents’ interests, resulting in suboptimal coastal development. We investigate how political alignment among neighboring mayors facilitates intergovernmental cooperation in the development of coastal areas. We leverage causal effects by applying a close-elections Regression Discontinuity Design to the universe of buildings in Spain. Municipalities with party-aligned mayors develop 46% less land than politically isolated ones, and politically homogeneous coastal areas develop less than fragmented ones. The effect is more salient for land closest to shore or previously occupied by forests, in municipalities with a large share of protected land, and for relevant environmental markers, such as air and bathing water pollution. These results underscore the importance of cooperative political endeavors in managing development spillovers, with environmental considerations assuming a central role.

Abstract: To what extent does the incumbent party’s identity shape public policies? We investigate this question by examining national and regional policies in Spain. First, we analyze the evolution of voter preferences, and of the platforms of the two mainstream parties (Partido Socialista Obrero Español [PSOE] and Partido Popular [PP]), and the newer challenger parties that emerged post-financial crisis (Ciudadanos, Podemos, and Vox). We focus on three key national-level issue dimensions: economic, social, and centralization. As expected, the right-wing PP adopts a more conservative stance on all dimensions compared to the left-wing PSOE. However, the policy gap between these two parties remains relatively stable until the mid-2000s, with party platforms tracking the evolution of citizen preferences. After this period, platforms start to diverge, especially in the case of new parties, which display radical stances on these dimensions. We also provide descriptive evidence suggesting that these platform differences have translated into enacted policies. Second, to offer causal evidence on the effect of party identity on policy decisions, we examine partisan disparities in regional fiscal policies. Our findings reveal significant differences in tax policy following the granting of tax autonomy to the regions, somewhat moderated by tax competition and fiscal limits.

Abstract: We provide new empirical and theoretical evidence on the spatial consequences of public policies driven by electoral motives. Using exogenous variation in the timing of natural disasters, we show that hurricanes occurring close to Election Day in the United States cause increased local post-disaster efforts. These electorally motivated measures lead populations to sort into hazard prone areas. To comprehend the aggregate implications of this sorting pattern, we introduce the relationship between electoral cycles and public policies in a spatial equilibrium model. We show that electorally motivated post-disaster policies result in declines in welfare, productivity, and overall output.

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of floods on urban development dynamics using geolocalized data on the universe of buildings in Spain from 1996 to 2021. We provide empirical evidence that floods foster local urban development and yield taller, more compact urban layouts, attracting populations, increasing property values, and shifting land use away from the agricultural and industrial sectors. We argue that adaptive responses to natural disasters may trigger positive local spillovers strong enough to overcompensate for the flood's destructive nature.

Abstract: Social interactions are crucial to a city's cohesion, and the high frequency of interaction reflects many benefits of density. However, adverse environmental conditions, such as pollution or pandemics, may critically affect these interactions as they shift preferences over meeting locations and partners. Some interactions may be shifted to the virtual space, while other non-planned interactions may disappear. We analyze spatial interaction networks in Singapore covering about half of the adult population at a fine-grained spatial resolution to understand the importance of population mixing and places' amenities for urban network resilience. We document that environmental shocks negatively affect total interactions. Still, conditional on meeting physically, the number and type of location options may crucially impact the intensity and type of social interactions. The interplay between preferences for meetings partners, locations, and mobility determines population mixing and the fragility of urban social networks.

Abstract: While natural hazards have never been so frequent in modern history, the political economy of disaster preparation remains largely understudied. To prepare for natural disasters, local governments can adopt mitigation measures (e.g., infrastructure elevation, retrofitting, shelter construction, etc.). However, in doing so, there is a trade-off between risk reduction and risk disclosure as these initiatives may signal latent dangers of a place to unsuspecting homebuyers. Increased media coverage may ease this trade-off by revealing these dormant risks. I develop a measure of newspaper coverage of storms using data on newspapers’ circulation and occurrence of storms at the ZIP code level in the United States. Using

the variation in this measure, I identify the effects of heightened media attention on local governments’ mitigation efforts under the Hazard Mitigation Grant program managed by FEMA. I find that when newspaper coverage is high, jurisdictions that have experienced severe storms tend to implement significantly more mitigation projects. Conversely, when coverage of storms is low, jurisdictions do not undertake mitigation projects after being hit by a storm. This effect appears to be driven by non-resident property investors seeking to maximize their investment’s value. I argue that local governments, whose budget critically depends on housing taxes and sales, might strategically underinvest in disaster preparation to avoid revealing their jurisdictions’ inherent risk to otherwise uninformed homebuyers.